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New Department Working Paper

Dec 01, 2022


Assistant Professor of Economics, Rumen Kostadinov has posted a working paper titled, "Worst-case Regret in Ambiguous Dynamic Games"


I study a general model of repeated interactions between long-run players who have no probabilistic beliefs about the environment in which future interactions will take place. I introduce a notion of equilibrium, where at each history players minimize their regret from forgoing an alternative strategy under the worst-case sequence of future games, taking as given the strategies of other players. I derive a recursive characterization of equilibrium outcomes for fixed discounting, as well as a folk theorem. I demonstrate the tractability of the characterization in applications to risk-sharing and partnership games.


For the full set of working papers  please see:
RePEC/ideas (